






Deregulation and Labour Law in Italy  
 
 
Deregulation and labour law: an historic-conceptual frame of reference 
 
The subject of this national report is the analysis of the connection between deregula-
tion and Iabour law. The main objective is not simply to describe the more recent evo-
lution in Italian employment law and the most relevant factors driving the change in 
progress, but to look at the effects that these modifications have on capitalistic produc-
tion and, in particular, their shape in juridical terms. Through the evaluation of emerg-
ing tendencies and reforms that have recently characterized Italian labour law – moving 
towards a progressive deregulation of employment relations – l will try to answer ques-
tions that, today more than ever, are central to our field. The questions challenge, if not 
the theoretical bases, at least the necessity of many rules that constitute the normative 
body of labour law. The questions are direct but at the same time complicated and 
radical: what is the future and the role of labour law in the 21st century? Do we need a 
new concept of labour law? To answer these questions from a perspective that allows a 
comparison between different legal systems, we need to clarify what we mean exactly 
by ‘deregulation’ and ‘labour law’, in such a way as to avoid answers that are ideologi-
cal and pre-determined. 
It is necessary to point out, first of all, that the term ‘deregulation’ can be translated with 
different words in Italian which then correspond to different legal concepts. Some Ital-
ian scholars, for example, use the expression ‘delegification’ to refer to the inversion of 
the trend that has brought about a wide ‘juridification’ of employment relations through 
coercive and mandatory rules to protect subordinate work (see Ferraro, 1990, 149). 
Used in this sense the term ‘delegification’ is not a correct translation of the word de-
regulation. It is true that from a technical and formal point of view the term delegifica-
tion is part of the most comprehensive concept of deregulation. but a part cannot ex-
press the whole. In fact, the term delegitication simply indicates the relationship be-
tween legal sources at different levels, and more precisely, the process of devolution of 
regulations of specific subjects or institutions from a legislative source to a lower source 
(i.e. regulations or collective agreement). 
                                            
 
By translating the term deregulation with the word delegification we actually indicate a 
juridical operation of a rather limited range, thereby sacrificing and losing the complex 
meaning of the term. 
Equally limited is the doctrinal trend which suggests translating the term deregulation to 
indicate a broad but generic philosophical concept which supports a reduction of the 
area covered by state regulation, i.e. the area in which all forms of behaviour are regu-
lated in order to satisfy public interest (for this perspective see Tremonti, 1985, 107). 
Again the translation of the term deregulation risks being partial and misleading even if 
it well represents the ideological and cultural meaning behind the word. Defined in 
these terms, the analysis of the connection between deregulation and labour law allows 
only for a superficial interpretation of the changes that have recently affected Italian la-
bour law It is, in fact, a perspective of research that focuses attention only on the flexi-
bilisation of employment relations, but does not contribute to a consideration of the 
real causes that have affected the evolution of Italian labour law. The fact that human 
behaviour is not subject to state regulation does not mean that such behaviour ceases to 
be relevant from a juridical point of view. Simply, these acts or facts have their source 
of regulation in private (individual or collective) autonomy. It should be noted that de-
regulation does not involve fewer juridical rules, but rather more correctly, fewer State 
rules to the advantage of a wider normative authority of private (individual or collec-
tive) autonomy. It has been rightly pointed out in this regard that when private rule, 
more or less broadly, substitutes the public one, the number of necessary negotiations 
increases because each case requires adjudication instead of being able to refer to a 
single rule fixed for every case by a public source. 
It is surely more useful to use the term deregulation in the broad and undetermined 
sense, subject to precision during analysis. From this point of view the concept of de-
regulation must be compared with a concept of juridification. To reflect on the reasons 
that have brought about the juridification of employment relations actually means ques-
tioning the reasons that have brought about the construction of the rules set up which 
constitute labour law. This analysis could then lead us to understand, with a better 
critical knowledge, die present trend widespread in all systems towards the deregula-
tion of employment relations. 
In this connection, it is useful to question and resolutely reject the validity of an inter-
pretation that, very simplistically, identifies labour law as an instrument of protection of 
the Weaker party (the worker) as compared with the great contractual power of the em-
ployer, an interpretation that then leads to individualising, in the present process of de-
regulation of employment relations, the effort to loosen some of the stiffness and con-
straints on the competitiveness of enterprises in the international scene and/or contrib-
ute to the creation of new employment opportunities at a time when there are alarming 
rates of unemployment. The historic perspective reveals a profile often neglected by la-
bour law doctrine, and that still points to labour law as a means of weaker party protec-
tion. As a reaction to a new organisation of production methods and circulation of 
wealth, the employment relations regulation was not, in fact, able simply to turn into a 
unilateral means of protection and emancipation of a party characterised by social un-
der-protection and economic dependence. Although not always supported by values 
and/or homogenous political, economic and social objectives, right from the beginning 
the State’s regulatory intervention in the process of industrialisation never assumed any 
unidirectional aspect. 
Beyond the contingent motivation (declared or real) of each single given norm, the dis-
cipline of employment, as a matter of fact, assumes importance right from the start, not 
only under the traditional framework of worker protection, but also under the concur-
rent and certainly no less important context of the conservation of social peace and ex-
isting order, of the health of the young and of the integrity of descent, of the rationalisa-
tion of the production system, of the regulation of the forms of competition among en-
trepreneurs, etc. The product of the juridification of employment relations is therefore, 
undoubtedly, a distributive right of protection and resources, but also, at the same time. 
a right of production i.e. a discipline of roles and of the means of production in an in-
dustrial society. 
Of particular note, from this point of view, is the historic evolution of the discipline of 
employment placement and the progressive suppression of private intermediary and 
speculative centres of employment. In an employment market profoundly modified, 
marked by chronic imbalances between demand and request of employment and des-
tined to be regulated exclusively by the blind game of contrary forces, it was, in fact, 
inevitable that the control of hiring and occupation flows in general ended up repre-
senting a formidable instrument of power capable of influencing not only the results of 
the process of capitalistic production, but even earlier, influencing the same political-
institutional balances of different national systems. 
Chiefly in those countries in which the industrialisation process delayed development, 
and conversely, where the tone of the union debates tended to undermine the very 
foundation of the emerging capitalistic society, the question of state control of place-
ment became a true and proper ‘question of sovereignty’ to the point of legitimising the 
State’s direct intervention in the economy, in contradiction to, only apparently, the free-
trade principles then dominant. The growing power of the working coalitions on an is-
sue so strategic to the ‘wealth of a nation’ – to use Adam Smith’s expression 7 like that 
of control (monopolistic) of one of the factors of production could not do other than 
represent a head-on challenge of the sovereignty of the emerging national State, labori-
ously still trying to free itself from the pre-capitalistic super-structure and from the en-
crustation of the ancien regime. The union’s capacity, real or only potential, to influ-
ence the process of creation and distribution of wealth and to affect the political-
institutional balances of the State, either by control of the employment market or 
through reformist and revolutionary stimulus, put the question of ‘economic sovereign-
ty’ as a necessary and unfailing complement of the political and territorial sovereignty. 
It is precisely with reference to the question of control of the employment market- re-
ferred to by employers as an instrument for establishing economic power and the ac-
quisition of labourers, and referred to by unions as a privileged channel of establishing 
an opposing union power – that determines the deep fracture between Continental Eu-
ropean countries and Anglo Saxon countries. While the former – chiefly Italy – repre-
sent a tradition more or less markedly ‘étatiste’ that in the name of the supremacy of the 
State has led to a progressive and massive juridification of employment relations 
through the intervention of the unbreakable rules of law and the State’s monopoly of 
the juridical production. The latter, proving themselves, even with specific differences, 
to be ‘stateless societies’, limit public intervention in the employment market to those 
few essential rules in order to ensure the ideal development of the capitalistic system of 
production, assuming a position of neutrality as regards the free flow of economic fac-
tors and of conflicts of interest that pass through the social body. 
 
In the evaluation of the reasons for this deep fracture, it is impossible to indicate with 
any degree of precision the role assumed by the ideologies and by the ideals of justice 
and solidarity as regards the weight of the economic and social conditioning that have 
accompanied, in the diverse systems, the emerging process of industrialisation. Of par-
ticular concern is the risk of evaluating past events and institutions by applying para-
digms and classic models of the present to the point of misinterpreting the events and 
the defining processes intrinsically connected to them. 
Nevertheless, in our opinion, without wanting to propose a purely deterministic view of 
history and of the movements of ideas,1 two factors in particular can explain more than 
others why in Anglo Saxon countries ‘economic sovereignty’ is not considered a fun-
damental element for the full affirmation of political and territorial sovereignty with an 
affect on juridical rules of relations between capital and employment in general and on 
the process of casting of intermittent work through agencies in particular. In the first 
place, as has rightly been pointed out,2 the true peculiarity of the Anglo-American ex-
perience is having exorcised the revolutionary violence of the union movement right 
from its beginnings. Whereas in other countries it has lived for a long time with the in-
stitutional practices of the unions and of the workers movement, only to fizzle out 
much later and not without first giving rise to deep fractures and lacerations in the so-
cial body over the processes of legitimisation of the forms of production of Wealth and 
of appropriation of the ‘result’ of the work of others. The union movements in Britain 
and even more so in the USA were in effect well free of the destructive practices of 
Luddism, from the political suggestion of Cartism and from the utopia of revolutionary 
socialism, thus orientating themselves towards a new unionist creed that with self-help 
participated in the optimism of the Victorian society. In this particular cultural context, 
union control of the employment market was seen not as a destructive force against the 
political-institutional order of the modern State, but rather, together With strikes and 
collective agreements, as a spontaneous industrial demonstration and, at the same time, 
a factor of regulation of the competition and rationalisation of the capitalistic system of 
production ‘upon which (...) the maximum productivity of the community as a whole 
depends’.3 But even more decisive in this regard, because it also explains the peculiar 
behaviour of Anglo-American unionism, is the circumstance4
                                            
1 Still valid, in this regard, is the teaching of Max Weber (see Economia e società, Ed. Comunità, Milano), 
that shows well that a unidirectional relation of cause and effect does not exist between the juridical sys-
tem and economic system, but rather complex interrelations that do not allow identification of necessary 
laws and deterministic models of development of each system. 
 that both in Great Britain 
and in the USA the process of industrialisation happened spontaneously and was, right 
from its conception, firmly in the hands of a bourgeoisie that, on the one hand, force-
fully reclaimed full freedom of action and autonomy from the State and that, on the 
other hand, rapidly abandoned the establishment of the ancien régime in the centre of 
political and economic power. In these countries the control of production and of the 
appropriation of the value-added created by the work of others is achieved independ-
ently of the State and entirely entrusted, even when passing via the laissez-faire indi-
vidual to the collectivity, to the self-regulating capacity of the market. In Continental 
European countries industrialisation occurs under the intervention of the State and 
2 See P. Craveri (1990), voce Sindacato (storia), in Enc. Dir., vol. XLXX, Giuffrè, Milano, 661. 
3 S. Webb, B. Webb (1926 ma 1897), Industrial Democracy, Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., London. 
4 Well shown by G. Baglioni (1974), L’ideologia della borghesia industriale nell’Italia liberale, Einaudi, 
Torino, 40-48. 
through public control of economic and social factors, often overwhelming, as in the 
case of Italy, and not without profound tensions and social conflicts that upset the frag-
ile politico-institutional balance of the emerging capitalistic society, Apart from rare 
cases, these countries respond with a notable delay to the demands of industrialisation 
and try, nevertheless, to bridge the gap with Great Britain and the USA, progressively 
increasing the intensity and the role of the State’s intervention in the economic and so-
cial sphere. For these countries it was obligatory that the ‘economic sovereignty’ and, 
consequently, the control of the employment market and of the production and distri-
bution mechanisms of wealth, became instruments for the complete affirmation of po-
litical and territorial sovereignty both internally (as opposed to a wide process of private 
normative protection) and externally (in comparison and competition with other na-
tions). 
It is precisely these justifications for the juridical approach to employment relations that 
now explain the tendency toward deregulation. The recent and numerous changes in 
the mechanisms of production and circulation of Wealth that have established the de-
finitive separation between the limits of the State and those of the market,5 now render 
impractical any project of law meant to combine political-territorial sovereignty and 
economic sovereignty. In countries with an ‘étatiste’ tradition, the internationalisation 
of the economy and the globalisation of the market greatly accentuate the incapacity of 
the local and national protagonists to control this socio-economic phenomenon and 
with it, the crisis of the State-Nation. The greater ease with which the ‘stateless socie-
ties’ have adapted themselves to the changes of the economic market testifies to the 
present ineptitude of the imperative rule of law in the form of juridical innovations and 
highlights at the same time the greater flexibility of jurisdictional controls and/or of the 
market in adapting the right solutions to the recent changes in economic-productive 
structures. It is certainly not the case that now, faced with the internationalisation of the 
economic markets, the competition between different national labour laws has progres-
sively led to, in various countries and juridical systems, the takeover of the public mo-
nopoly on placement, and contextually, to the removal of the principle constraints that 
prevented the legalisation of the administration of labour. The rules of competition 
based by now on a supra-national scale have, in fact, brought about a progressive loos-
ening – or, in any case, a ‘circumvention’ – of all those displays of the State’s sover-
eignty that, in one way or another, represented an obstacle to the production and circu-
lation of Wealth, proposing again in new terms the old problem of legitimisation of the 
forms of acquisition of the value added by the labour of others, a problem that seemed 
definitively resolved with the creation of the normative model of the subordinate em-
ployment contract for an indefinite period. Even when it does not translate into an es-
cape into the ‘submerged’ and informal economy, the alteration of the traditional forms 
of acquisition and use of the work force is, by now, a constant of the modern processes 
of production of wealth. Very indicative in this respect is the gradual ‘legitimization of 
negotiation formalities originally undervalued to the extent of even being considered 
illegitimate’,6
                                            
5 The point is well shown, among others, by S. Cassese (1993), Oltre lo Stato: i limiti dei governi nazionali 
nel controllo dell’economia, in F. Galgano, S. Cassese, G. Tremonti, T. Treu, Nazioni senza ricchezza. 
Ricchezza senza nazione, il Mulino, Bologna, 35. 
 such as the ever more marked trend to adopt ‘formulas and institutions 
6 G. Ferraro (1998), Dal lavoro subordinato al lavoro autonomo, relazione AIDLASS su Impresa e nuovi 
modi di organizzare il lavoro. 
 
belonging to commercial law’.7 If the social parties and national governments do not 
seem presently capable of controlling the economic-productive structure and, at the 
most, limit themselves to look for ‘palliatives to resist change and contain the effects to 
the social level’,8
Not even in largely homogenous areas like the European Community, is there any 
movement towards the elaboration of a regulative outline of the alternative juridical 
models of the subordinate employment contract for an indefinite period. The efforts of 
the European Union in this field have not, in fact, gone further than a Directive on the 
protection of the health and safety of temporary workers
 the same supra-national protagonists are still far from identifying effi-
cient instruments of regulation of the market and the economy and, in most cases, are 
limited to merely taking note of the changes in progress. 
9 and the weak and fruitless 
proposals of the Directive on the subject of temporary work as regards the elimination 
of distortions in competition and risks of social dumping resulting from the different so-
cial costs connected to the different national regulations of the forms of temporary 
work10. In comparison to these tenuous attempts at discipline of a contractual scheme 
alternative to those of an undefined and stable period that testify unequivocally to the 
persistent weakness of the European process of social integration, it has been the Court 
of Justice that has assumed a role of substitution, supplying a significant contribution 
towards the modernisation and harmonisation of the national employment markets. As 
shown by the events surrounding the invalidation of the Italian public monopoly of 
employment placement in light of the Community anti-monopoly norm,11 the Court of 
Justice has contributed to an increased use of market criteria in a subject area – that of 
regulation of employment relations – traditionally void of such logic. In fact, though 
changes have occurred in the economic-productive structure, there is still today strong 
national resistance on the regulative level that, in line with the original constitutive 
character of the discipline of employment relations and of the criteria for the legitimisa-
tion of the acquisition of the value added through the work of others, operates to keep 
the subject of labour within the competence reserved to the State legislator.12
Nevertheless, in the global market ‘keeping the national protective rules stationary  
 
without controlling the rules of running such a market means risking self-destruction: 
that is to say it can render invalid the competitiveness of the economic system and 
cause the progressive impoverishment of entire national collectives’.13
The uncertain results of the transition process from an economy regulated by national 
protagonists to a system of production and circulation of wealth governed by supra-
national regulation contributes to nurturing the emergence of informal practices and sui 
generis of using the labour of others, so much so that a thin correlation is made be-
 
                                            
7 S. Simitis (1997), Il diritto del lavoro ha ancora un futuro?, in Giornale Dir. Lav. Rel. Ind., 609. 
8 R. Blanpain (1998), Il diritto del lavoro nel XXI secolo: l’era dei lavoratori dal ‘portafoglio’ creativo, in 
Dir. Rel. Ind., n. 3, 333. 
9 Directive n. 91/383/CEE. 
10 See, among others, Jeffery M., The Commission Proposals on ‘Atypical Work’: Back to the Drawing-
Board ... Again, in Industrial Law Journal,1995, 296. 
11 See Court of Justice, causa C-55/96, Job Centre. 
12 See Treu T. (1997), Politiche del lavoro e strumenti di promozione dell’occupazione: il caso italiano in 
una prospettiva europea,in M. Biagi (a cura di), Mercati e rapporti di lavoro. Commentario alla legge 24 
giugno 1997 n. 196, Giuffrè, Milano, 3 e ss. (e ora in Scritti in onore di Giuseppe Federico Mancini, 
Giuffrè, Milano, vol. I, 597 e ss.). 
13 See Treu T. (1994), L’internazionalizzazione dei mercati: problemi di diritto del lavoro e metodo 
comparato, in Studi in onore di R. Sacco, Giuffrè, Milano, vol. I,  1117 e ss. 
tween the globalisation of economies and the progressive ‘informalisation of employ-
ment relations’. The convergence in the practice of the use of labour, according to 
some authors,14 leading to the loosening of dependent work protection in response to 
market pressures appears therefore to be more the fruit of competition between different 
national labour laws than the result of a conscious process of harmonisation guided by 
supra-national protagonists and finalised to conciliate competitiveness with social jus-
tice.15 The better the resistance to favour the evolution of economic-productive rela-
tions, the more risk there is of destructuring employment relations.16
The above should help understand that the regulation of employment relations is not 
responding exclusively to a ratio of pure protection of the weaker party as a result of the 
disorder and failures of the free market in the process of industrialisation. Presented in 
terms of facing off the advantages of the free market and the constraints of law, the is-
sue of the deregulation of employment relations is not only badly posed and misleading 
but also historically incorrect. Firstly, because the ’advantages’ of the free market versus 
the effect of public intervention are not at all clear. No particular proof exists showing 
that the deregulation of employment relations can, per se, bring about a reduction in 
unemployment or an increase in competitiveness in enterprises; on the contrary, it 
seems well illustrated that an excessive precariousness in employment relations, be-
sides destroying stable work posts, ends up in the long run proving itself to be counter-
productive for the entire production system, leaving the enterprises Without a qualified 
and reliable work-force. From this perspective of more importance are the structural 
policies of employment; industrial, financial and public spending management policies; 
the rules that discipline international commerce or the access to the system of credit 
and to the capital market or, the local policies of support of the productive and social 
tissue, well represented in our country by the experience of the ‘territorial pacts’ and by 
‘area contracts’. 
 
In Italy the deregulation of employment relations has not been guided by the legislator 
but accomplished in an underground way, thereby showing the uselessness of the im-
perative rule of law to govern. This explains the elevated levels of illegal Work and the 
conspicuous move away from dependent work towards self-employment and irregular 
forms of work. Faced with the complex transformation of the economic, political and 
social reality of our country, the question, cyclically posed, is no longer whether or not 
the juridical-institutional balances and the normative order of Italian labour law have, 
by now, reached the fatal level of safety or saturation beyond which it is no longer pos-
sible to proceed.17
                                            
14 Mitchell D.J.B. (1999), È in atto un processo di convergenza?, General Report on Forum 5 of the Bolo-
gna Meeting of the IIRA, September 1998, in Dir. Rel. Ind., 1999/1, forthcoming. 
 Unless one is prepared to admit – or concede, at least temporarily – 
a progressive reversal of the levels of dependent work protection, the real problem 
would appear to be another, i.e. how to establish a limit, and especially, through which 
instruments the State (legislator, magistrate, public administration) can today push on 
towards the rightful and irreversible recovery of underground and atypical work, so as 
to then avoid running the risk of breaking the fragile balances upon which we base the 
entire socio-economic, and thus contributing to further marginalising large strata of the 
15 This was the subject of the 11th International Congress of IIRA, Bologna 22-26 September 1998. 
16 See: Simitis S. (1997), Il diritto del lavoro ha ancora un futuro?, op. cit., where he speaks about a pro-
cess of déconstruction du droit du travail. 
17 It is the question that posed by Giugni G. (1982), Il diritto del lavoro negli anni ‘80 , in Giornale Dir. 
Lav. Rel. Ind., 375, as regard the ‘labor law of the crisis’ of the eighties. 
 
productive forces of the country. The answer to this question is certainly not an easy 
one and is, to the contrary, made particularly complex by the relentless rules of compe-
tition at, by this stage, the supra-national scale, that gradually render ever more ‘eccen-
tric’ the role of the State, given the decisive and tumultuous process of internationalisa-
tion of the economy, of the transformation of the productive process and of the distribu-
tion of the wealth. The crisis of legality that increasingly characterises the modem social 
State cannot, in fact, be explained merely on the basis of a diffused and vague wish to 
get away from the laws of the State considered ‘inauspicious. confusing and invasive’. 
More pervasive than the of rejection of the progressive penetration of the State appa-
ratus into civil society is the ineffectiveness of ‘State sovereignty over the rules that gov-
ern the mechanisms of production and the transfer of wealth (to affect) indirectly but in 
a decisive way the discipline of work’.18
There is truth in the theory formulated at the beginning of the century by Jean Cruet, 
according to whom ‘the law does not dominate society but if anything it expresses it’.
 
19 
This does not, however, change the fact that labour law emerges and develops in con-
tradiction to this assumption as a form of social reform that as such imposes an undeni-
able effort – a tension – to change society. From this point of view, the increasing social 
complexity and the changes underway in the economic and productive structures can-
not do other than lead to a broadening of these same efforts of public intervention, both 
in the traditional area of the distribution of wealth and in the new one of support for 
employment and for the productive system.20
Consequently, the scales are weighted in favour of those who recognise that labour law 
develops inside a market economy, that the law is more than business efficiency, and 
therefore, assign to the process of employment relations regulation the necessary means 
to adapt the imperative of efficiency to social justice and individual freedom.
 
21
Against this background, we will go on to develop the theses on the basis of two con-
crete and complementary developments: (a) the introduction of private mediators in the 
work market and the recent legalisation of temporary work through an agency, and (b) 
the proposals of reform of Italian labour law in search of new answers for the 21st cen-
tury. Before developing this analysis, a brief synthesis of the present evolution of Italian 




                                            
18 See Treu T. (1994), L’internazionalizzazione dei mercati: problemi di diritto del lavoro e metodo 
comparato, cit., 1122. 
19 J. Cruet, Le vie du droit et l’impuissance des lois, Flammarion, Paris, 1908, 3 (as cited by A. Supiot, Du 
bon usage des lois en maitière d’emploi, cit., 336), according to whom, it would be interesting to verify 
the validity of such theory over the Century, there seems to be no doubt about his validity in the subject 
of labor policy: ‘en ce domaine, le constat de l’impuissance des lois est tombé un jour de la bouche mê-
me du Monarque: ‘Contre le chomage, on a tout essayé …’ en vain! La cause dès lors semble entendue 
et le consensus établi: on ne crée pas d’emploi par décret; les lois ne pouvent rien à l’empli, qui procède 
en dernière instance d’un certain état de l’économie. Le droit de l’emploi ne pourrait guère que mettre en 
oeuvre les dures lois de l’économie, leur donner un visage humain pour en assurer mieux l’inexorable 
application’. 
20 Treu T. (1990), voce Diritto del lavoro, Digesto, Utet, Torino, IV ed., 1990, excerpt, 50. 
21 Mengoni L., in G. Giugni, L. Mengoni, B. Veneziani, Tre commenti alla Critique du droit du travail di 
Supiot, in Giornale Dir. Lav. Rel. Ind., 1995, 477. 
Deregulation and labour law in Italy: the new legal framework 
 
After a long period of relative stability, characterised by a progressive expansion of the 
statutes governing dependent work and the consequent move away from the accepted 
legal framework of labour, ltalian employment law has recently gone through a great 
metamorphosis (see Biagi, 1998, ld., 1997). 
Act no. 196/1997 (the so-called ‘Treu Package’) and the resulting regulations to imple-
ment the act have extended and strengthened the range of atypical forms of work: 
fixed-term contract, part-time work, temporary work through an agency (dispatching 
work), apprenticeship, training contract, work experiences, job internships (borse la-
voro) and public works jobs (lavori di pubblica utilità), Act no. 59/1997 (the so-called 
‘Bassanini Law’) and the subsequent Legislative Decree no. 469/ 1997 have thoroughly 
redesigned the boundaries between the public and private areas in labour market man-
agement and employment services, thus eliminating the rigidity and inefficiency of the 
public monopoly of placement. Already well implemented or at least on the way to be-
ing completely defined are measures to support research and technological innova-
tions, financing of entrepreneurial development in depressed areas or in areas of urban 
decay, the reorganisation of incentives for hiring and geographical mobility, improving 
infrastructures through qualified public investment, the reorganisation of the profes-
sional training system and, in particular, of continued training as an instrument to raise 
employability and the quality of the worker pool. Ready for definitive take-off are new 
instruments of huge importance for local development such as the so-called ‘area con-
tracts’ (contratti d’area) and ‘territorial pacts’ (patti territoriali), and only now are we be-
ginning to appreciate the enormous impact and the future development of a previous 
reform: the 
so-called privatisation of public employment initiated by the Legislative Decree no. 
29/1993 and implemented through the Legislative Decree no. 369/ 1997 and the Legis-
lative Decree no. 80/1998 (on this point see, in general, Treu, 1998), Concerning de-
regulation of individual labour relations, three main points should be emphasised: 
1. The growth of the independent contract, self-employment subcontracting, insourcing 
and outsourcing; 
2. Frequent derogation from legal norms set by protective labour legislation through the 
use of collective bargaining agreements; and 3. The flexibilisation of working-hours 
regulations. 
With regard to the first point, the most impressive form of indirect deregulation is the 
explosion in the use/abuse of contractual schemes that, from a formal point of view, are 
not subordinate, but that guarantee the use of union workers without applying labour 
regulations. We call this form of work quasi-subordinate or coordinate and it represents 
a third category. This third legal scheme of private autonomy can easily escape the 
reach of employment law, and it is not easy for the courts to requalify this form of work 
as subordinate employment. We presently have around two million workers engaged 
under this contractual scheme that bypass legal and collective rules. Other ways to 
contravene labour law include commercial contracts such as fictitious trainer contracts, 
franchising, sub-contracting and, in general, all kinds of out- and insourcing. This is the 
way to side step the rules on dismissal. 
In order to control the undermining of labour law, there are more and more cases in 
which the legislation allows derogations from legal norms set by protective labour legis-
lation through the use of collective bargaining agreements. This is particularly true in 
 
the use of atypical forms of contract. From a legal point of view fixed-term contracts, 
temporary employment through an agency and part-time work are still considered ex-
ceptions to the rule of the open-ended and full-time contract. 
However, collective bargaining has the power to enlarge the use of all kinds of atypical 
forms of contracts and thus to get around dismissal law. In this context, it is relevant to 
look at the procedure adopted to request a derogation from legal norms set up by pro-
tective labour legislation: 
(a) first of all, in addition to the original justifications established by the legislator, the 
collective agreement can identify additional circumstances that allow for an atypical 
contract; 
(b) in doing so, the collective agreement must establish the maximum percentage of 
fixed-terms contracts, temporary employment through an agency, part-time contracts, 
apprenticeships and so on allowed in any undertaking; 
(c) this is only possible in the case of a collective agreement signed by a representative 
trade union. 
Through collective bargaining it has even been possible to introduce new legal 
schemes never experimented with previously like job-sharing and labour-on-call. Quite 
recently, with a simple circular, the Minister of Labour accepted job-sharing or labour-
on-call especially when they are allowed by collective bargaining. 
So, through collective bargaining it has been possible to experiment with small doses of 
regulated flexibility in order to remove the principal obstacles in the functioning of the 
regular work market and develop a favourable climate for the creation of new employ-
ment. 
From this perspective – creation of new employment – the debate is now concentrated 
on flexibilisation and reduction of working time. Working time regulations in Italy have 
been based for a long time on a 1923 royal decree limiting working hours to 8 h per 
day and 48 h per week. However, further legislation is about to be enacted to implant 
the EU regulations in this field, It should be emphasised, first of all, that this legislation 
has never been revised because the social partners have always preferred to regulate 
working time by means of collective bargaining in order to preserve their bargaining 
autonomy, Recently, Act 196/1997 introduced new rules, It fixed normal working time 
at 40 h a week and allowed for national collective agreements to provide for shorter 
hours and for normal working time to be the average length of work time over a period 
not exceeding one year, Social partners are requested by this act to negotiate a new 
draft legislation aimed at transposing the provisions of the EU directive on working 
time. This new legislation confirms the big role of collective bargaining in introducing 
further and more convincing regulations. 
The debate on the 35-h-week has been of increasing importance recently. 
Following the French model, a proposal to reduce the work week to 35 h is presently 
under discussion in the Parliament. The Government is proposing a legislative measure 
largely based upon contractual agreements. The most recent proposal is to provide 
some forms of incentives to reduce weekly working time and sanctions on the use of 
over-time. The 35h legal working time should be enacted by the next century after a 
transition phase based on experimental contractual agreements. Small firms could be 
excluded from the 35h regime, The aim is only to reduce working time, not to re-
organise at plant level. 
These and other interventions clearly indicate that labour law, originally intended as a 
unilateral method of protection established to regulate a unique model of dependent 
work (i.e. the typical full-time contract for an indefinite period), is today passed over 
not only by the ltalian legislator and but by business, which for a long time has experi-
mented (sometimes on the boundaries of legality) with new contractual schemes of or-
ganising work. Particularly symbolic in this respect is the case of temporary work 
through an agency which has for a long time been experimented with in business (see 
Tiraboschi, 1994), in spite of a very rigid framework binding this form of work until the 
recent legalisation through art. 1-11 of Act no. 196/1997 (see para. III). 
The reform process does not stop here. The transition from a monolithic and rigid la-
bour law (il diritto del lavoro) to more comprehensive and dynamic labour laws – now 
defined and declined in the plural (il diritto dei lavori) – which take into consideration 
the evolving society and economy, has only just begun. Phenomena noted and con-
stantly quoted by sociologists and economists – like the globalisation of markets and 
technological innovation, together with the old economic diseases of growth of illegal 
work and the legal strategies to escape from the rules of dependent work – now impose 
a new projectile strength that allows a decisive updating of Italian employment law. 
Paradoxically, the same statistical evidence about atypical and irregular work22
The jobs of the future require simple and flexible rules capable of dealing with uncer-
tainties during the process of qualification which is a traditional source of contention. 
 shows 
that it is not a lack of work but rather a lack of regulations and contractual schemes 
able to extract the work from illegality and divide it equally among all those involved in 
the labour market. In particular, the conceptual distinction between contract of service 
and contract for services is more and more inadequate in regulating the evolution of the 
Italian labour market. 
A typical characteristic of the Italian labour market is that the compression of numerous 
forms of work into the rigid scheme of contract of service and contract for services 
pushes all the atypical forms of work into a large grey area, very close to illegal work, 
not to mention the desire to circumvent labour regulations and the need for such forms 
of work for the maintenance of the business or in the interest of the workers. In order to 
progress from this problematic and fragmented framework it is necessary to experiment 
with new ways of making labour law such as the recent circular no. 43/ 1998 from the 
Minister of Labour which recognised the legitimacy of a contractual scheme such as 
job-sharing, up until then never experimented with for fear of possible controversies re-
garding the exact qualification of this form of working relationship (remember that part-
time is still forbidden under Italian labour law). The circular demonstrated that it is not 
necessary to wait for Parliament to act to regulate new work schemes, but that in some 
cases, administrative intervention clarifying the limits and the fundamental rules of the 
contract is sufficient. 
This does not mean removing the fundamental protection of labour law. But experi-
mentation with ‘regulated flexibility’ (flessibilità normale) in small doses can contribute 
to the removal of some of the obstacles hindering the regular work market, while offer-
ing a favourable climate for the creation of new employment and for the channelling of 
supply and demand which, today, is dispersed and fragmented due to a lack of ade-
quate information and instruments to evaluate the work-force (see Treu, l997). From 
this perspective, the recent legalisation of temporary work through an agency and the 
                                            
22 In this context it is enough underline that the Italian Institute for Statistic (ISTA) has recently shown that 
in Italy there are more or less 5 million of irregular workers engaged in underground economy corre-
sponding to about 23 percent of the Italian workforce. 
 
end of the State’s monopoly of placement are symbolic for the future development of 




The abolishment of the state’s monopoly in employment services and the legalisation 
of temporary work through an agency in Italy, between experimentation and social 
concertation 
 
It should be pointed out at the outset that the recent legalisation of temporary work 
through an agency cannot simply be interpreted as either a process of deregulation of 
the Italian labour market or as a new attitude of the Italian Government faced with a 
drastic reduction in labour standards. Taking into consideration the ineffectiveness of 
regulation on the public employment service and the conspicuous presence on the Ital-
ian labour market of a sprawling illegal network made up of private agencies and co-
operatives acting as intermediaries, Act no. 196/1997 represents an attempt to re-
regulate a sector which has remained for too long outside the law (Tiraboschi, 1997). 
The introduction of temporary work through an agency into our legal system represents 
an opportunity to clarify once and for all the difference between the illegitimate inter-
mediary in the hiring of labour (still illegal under article 1, Act no. 1369/1960) and le-
gitimate intermediary justified by recent movements in the labour market and in the or-
ganisation of work. The objective of the Italian Government is to reshape some of the 
guidelines of labour law to make them compatible with the ever-increasing economic 
constraints. The procedural technique adopted by the Italian legislator is noteworthy. 
Act no. 196/1997 reflects the previous agreement between the Government and the so-
cial parties (sec Employment Pact of 24 September 1996 and prior to that Agreement on 
the cost of labour of 23 July 1993). The legalisation process follows a period of indis-
pensable social legitimisation. In fact, as demonstrated by comparable experience, only 
social legitimisation can grant a stable juridical framework and real possibilities for fu-
ture development in this area (compare, for example, the French case with the German 
one). 
Naturally, the will to reach social consensus has given way to some (perhaps excessive) 
compromises and limitations. But it should be pointed out that this act is for the most 
part experimental: after two years of enforcement, article 11 provides for a meeting be-
tween the Government and the social parties in order to introduce, if necessary, correc-
tions and revisions. In any case, the more contested points are left to the process of col-
lective bargaining. This will involve the social parties that have the power to implement 
and effect changes in the labour regulations, especially to determine when and where 
temporary workers can be employed and what percentage they represent of the total 
number of workers of the user employer. 
 
 
1. Agencies Authorised to Supply Temporary Labour Services 
 
Article 2 of the Act lays down very strictly who is authorised to supply temporary 
agency labour. As in France, Germany and other European countries the supply of la-
bour cannot be performed freely by anyone who wishes to engage in this area, but is 
permitted only to an ‘agency’ specifically authorised by the Ministry of Labour to do so, 
It is important to point out that the activity of supplying labour can be performed only 
by ‘legal persons’ and not by individuals. These legal persons must be registered as a 
company on a special list created by the Ministry of Labour. 
Registration as an agency is subject to evidence that the applicant has met specific re-
quirements: 
• the legal form must be that of an enterprise/undertaking (the notion of enter-
prise/undertaking includes co-operatives, but additional requirements make it very dif-
ficult to use a co-operative in labour supply. See below); 
• the name of the enterprise must include the words ‘enterprise for the supply of tem-
porary labour’; 
• provide capital of not less than l billion Italian lire and for the first two years of activ-
ity a guaranteed deposit of 700 million Italian lire; from the third year, in place of the 
deposit a bank or insurance guarantee for not less than 5 percent of the turnover in the 
previous year, net of the value added tax and in any case no less that 700 million Ital-
ian lire; 
• presence of the registered office or branch within the territory of the Italian State; 
• identification of the activity of supply of temporary workers as the sole business on 
the hypothesis that ‘mixed enterprises (supply and placement of workers) can be less 
easily controlled and more subject to abuses and potential fraud; 
• availability of offices and professional skills appropriate for performance of activity of 
supply of labour; 
• guarantee that the service is available throughout the national territory and in not less 
than four Regions. 
Special provisions pertain to the personal qualifications of directors, general managers 
and managers: 
• absence of criminal convictions: for crimes against the state, crimes against the public 
trust or against the public economy, for the crime of association of a mafia-like charac-
ter (under article 416-bis of the Penal Code) or of unpremeditated crimes carrying a 
penalty of imprisonment for not less than three years for crimes or misdemeanours un-
der laws aimed at the prevention of accidents at work or under laws on labour or social 
security; 
• not subject to preventive measures: special surveillance by the police, interdiction to 
reside in one or more municipalities other than that of legal or habitual residence as 
provided for under Italian law. 
Authorisation to supply temporary agency labour may also be granted to a workers’ co-
operative which, in addition to meeting the conditions required for other companies, 
must have at least fifty members and, among these, as financing member, a fund for the 
development of co-operative; and it must employ non-partner-employees for a number 
of days not exceeding one third of the days of work performed by the co-operative as a 
whole. In this case, however, not the worker-partners but only the workers employed 
by the co-operative can be supplied by the co-operative as a temporary labour. This 
provision is highly controversial since it seems to be in opposition to the general prin-
ciple governing workers co-operatives under which priority and preference in job op-
portunities are given to partners, not to non-partners. Authorisation may also be issued 
to companies directly or indirectly controlled by the State with the aim of promoting 




2. The Contract for the Supply of Temporary Workers 
 
The contract for the supply of temporary workers (contratto di fornitura di lavoro tem-
poraneo) is a commercial contract through which an agency authorised by the Minister 
of Labour supplies one or more workers employed by the agency for either a specific 
mission or for an indefinite period to be al the disposition of a firm – or 3 public ad-
ministration – who benefits from these workers ‘in order to satisfy the need for tempo-
rary work’ (art. 1). This contract is the pivotal element on which the entire trilateral le-
gal scheme rests in the sense that it connects the three parties involved directly by iden-
tifying the legal relations between the agency and the user and indirectly by specifying 
the kind of work, the duration the remuneration and so on This explains why, although 
it is a normal commercial contract the Italian legislation has put a lot of emphasis on its 
regulation. The protection of the worker derives from the regulations which govern the 
contract and especially from the division of the rights, the powers, the obligations and 
the responsibilities between the agency and the user. 
As a general rule, the supply of temporary workers is still forbidden; 
• for jobs of ‘low professional content’ identified as such by the national collective 
agreement of the industry to which the client organisation belongs, signed by the ’com-
paratively representative’ trade union organisations; 
• to replace workers exercising the right to strike; 
• in production units in which, during the previous twelve months, there have been 
collective dismissals involving workers assigned to the tasks to which the temporary la-
bour refers, except in the event that it is to replace absent workers with the right to re-
tain their job; 
• in production units in which there is a suspension of relations or a reduction in hours 
with the right to ‘wage integration’ (a kind of unemployment pay) involving workers 
employed on the tasks for which the supply of temporary services is requested; 
• to client organisations that do not demonstrate to the Provincial Labour Office that 
they have carried out the risk assessment required by Italian law; 
• for work that requires special medical surveillance and for particularly hazardous 
work identified by decree of the Minister of Labour and Social Security and issued 
within sixty days of the present Act taking effect; 
• in agriculture and construction temporary work supply contracts can only at the pre-
sent time be introduced on an experimental basis following an agreement on the areas 
and models of experimentation between the employers’ organisations and the trade un-
ions ‘comparatively representative’ at the national level. 
The law (article l) provides that such a contract can be made: 
(1) ‘in cases of replacement of absent workers’. In comparison to Act no. 230/1962 on 
fixed-term contracts, this is a possibility of using temporary work through an agency to 
substitute for absent employees, including those who do not have the right to maintain 
their job. Under Act no. 230/1962, the use of temporary work in the form of fixed-term 
contracts was allowed only in order to substitute for workers with the right to maintain 
their job. If the collective agreement, legitimised by Act no. 56/1987, allows for the 
possibility to establish fixed-term contracts to substitute for those absent without the 
right to maintain their job, the type of contract chosen by the user can depend solely on 
financial considerations. The business must decide between the inferior cost of fixed-
term contracts and the relevant advantages gained through agency employment in 
terms of the quality of service of highly skilled and well-trained workers. 
(2) ‘in cases of a temporary need in an area requiring qualifications not covered by the 
firm’s ordinary production organisation’. This offers an exception to Act 1369 of 23 Oc-
tober 1960 outlawing intermediaries in the hiring of labour and banning labour-only 
sub-contracting. Therefore, these cases must be interpreted in a restrictive sense. In par-
ticular, this second case does not seem to allow for the use of temporary work through 
an agency in order to satisfy a boom in production which is not manageable using the 
ordinary production organisation. In other words, the concept of a ‘need in qualifica-
tions not covered by the firm’s ordinary production organisation’ must be expressed in 
an objective sense rather than referring to the skills and specialisations present in the 
firm. This interpretation conforms with the philosophy behind the Act: temporary work 
through an agency should not be considered an alternative to regular employment, but 
constitutes a complementary instrument. For these reasons one cannot agree with au-
thors who consider that the new norm allows in principle for a company to understaff 
the business, filling gaps with temporary employees. The high cost of temporary work 
through agency renders this strategy of HRM irrational rather than illegal from a juridi-
cal point of view; 
(3) ‘in the case provided for in the national collective agreement negotiated for the in-
dustry to which the client organisation belongs and signed by the comparatively repre-
sentative trade unions’. Attention should be paid to the new formula ‘comparatively 
representative unions’ which reflects the increasing problem of a number of unions co-
existing in the same industry, equally claiming to represent employees. This formula 
should empower the Government and local authorities to select those unions which, in 
the context of a specific sector/branch, are more representative than others, in com-
parative terms representing (not necessarily organising) more workers than others. It is 
unlikely that this legal solution will be able by itself to solve the problem of union rep-
resentation. One should add that it is necessary to develop appropriate legal mecha-
nisms to test in more effective ways the ability of trade union organisations to represent 
workers not affiliated with them as well. 
The contract for the supply of temporary workers must be in written form, the worker 
who provides his/her work to the client organisation is deemed to have been employed 
by the latter under an open-ended employment contract, Any clause intended to limit, 
even indirectly, the right of the client organisation to employ the worker at the end of 
the contract for temporary work is null and void. Further, a copy of the contract for 
temporary workers must be sent by the supplying agency to the Provincial Labour Of-
fice responsible for the territory within ten days of its signing. 
 
 
3. The Contract Between the Worker and the Agency 
 
The temporary agency employment contract is the contract by which the temporary 
employment agency employs due worker. The worker may be employed under a fixed-
term contract, i.e. for a specified time corresponding to the duration of the work for the 
client organisation, The worker may also, at the discretion of the temporary work 
agency, be employed on the basis of an open-ended contract, i.e. for an indeterminate 
time. Once employed, the temporary worker is required to carry out his/her activities in 
the interest and under the direction and control of the client organisation. The exercise 
of disciplinary power still belongs to the agency, on the assumption that the employ-
ment relationship is established between the agency and the worker. Nevertheless, Act 
 
196/1997 provides that the client/user company shall report to the agency on possible 
violation of work duties by the worker for possible disciplinary action. Commentators 
have underlined that this solution seems to be rather complicated, a consequence of 
the ‘triangular’ arrangement characteristic of the temporary agency work. 
In the case of employment for an indeterminate period, the worker remains at the dis-
posal of the agency even in periods when he/she is not working for a client organisa-
tion. In this case, the contract between the employee and the agency shall make provi-
sions for an income guarantee for periods in which no work is performed (‘availability 
bonus’). As far as the application of statutory or collectively agreed employment protec-
tion standards is concerned, the temporary work agency workers are not considered 
part of the workforce of the client/user firm, with the exception of health and safety 
provisions. The temporary work contract must be in written form and a copy must be 
given to the worker within five days of the start of activity with the client organisation. 
In absence of a written contract or indication of the start and finish of the job at the cli-
ent organisation, the contract for temporary employment converts into a contract for 
employment binding the agency for an open-ended period. However, the stated period 
of initial assignment may be extended, with the consent of the worker and in writing, in 
those cases and for the duration provided for in the national collective agreements for 
the category, lf the work continues beyond the specified time, the worker is deemed to 
have been employed in an open-ended relationship by the client organisation after the 
expiration of the specified time of temporary services. Thus, if the temporary work con-
tinues beyond the term initially agreed upon or subsequently extended, the worker has 
the right to an increase of 20% in daily pay for each day of continuation of the relation-
ship for ten days. This increase is chargeable to the agency if the continuation of the 
work has been agreed upon. 
Temporary workers must be employed with pay and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment equal to those to which employees at the same level of the client organisation 
are entitled. The principle of parity of treatment between permanent and temporary 
workers is found in the legislation of many European countries. However, the collective 
agreement of the industry to which the client organisation belongs can identify modali-
ties and criteria for determination and payment of wages and salaries in relation to the 
results achieved in implementing programs agreed upon between the parties or linked 
with the economic results of the organisation. 
 
 
4. The Legal Statute of Temporary Workers 
 
The great difficulties of providing effective protection of the individual and the collec-
tive rights of groups involved in the supply of temporary work have consistently para-
lysed the process of legalising this option. These stem not from the temporary and in-
termittent type of work in a user company, but from the structural and programmatic 
separation between the (holder of the) contract and the (real user of the) working rela-
tionship. In fact, for the temporary worker, an employment contract that involves two 
potential employers (the agency and the final employer), can mean a contract with ‘no 
stated effective employer’ (Siau, 1996, p. 16) or, in any case, with no visible control 
over the power and responsibilities connected to the use of a dependent work force. 
A particularly indicative example can be taken from the British experience. 
The deep uncertainties shown by the case law with regard to the contract between the 
intermittent worker and the temporary work agency, together with the difficulty of inte-
grating the requisites of continued seniority required by British legislation, have made 
labour law to protect dependent employment relationships substantially irrelevant for 
the majority of this kind of worker. There is a real danger that in this and other cases the 
worker is demoted ‘from subject of rights to transitory object’ (Ghezzi, 1995, p. 229). 
To face up to the danger of masking the real relationships of production and, conse-
quently, that of a substantial undermining of workers’ rights, the legislator has intro-
duced a series of corrections to guarantee, although only in an indirect way, the rights 
of temporary workers: rigorous selection of those qualified for the supply of temporary 
work (art. 2); limitation of the cases of a legitimate appeal to the supply of temporary 
work and reference, for the non-disciplined cases, to the provisions of Act no, l369/ 
1960 that today still represent the general rule with respect to the qualification of the 
interposing phenomena (art. 1, 10); clear and unequivocal division of the responsibili-
ties and obligations of the assignor and the assignee with regard to the protection of the 
health and safety of temporary workers (art. 6, 1), to social security benefits and con-
tributive and welfare services (art. 9, 1), and to the transfer to the worker of wages (art. 
6, 3), to the damages caused to third parties by temporary workers during their mission 
(art. 6, 7), to accident and professional diseases insurance (art. 9, 2), etc. 
Coupled with these ‘indirect’ guarantees of protection of temporary workers’ rights – 
purely instrumental, most of the time, to safeguard steady work and full-time employ-
ment – is Act no. 196/1997 with some important provisions for ‘direct’ protection of in-
dividual and collective temporary worker’s rights which can be considered a sort of real 
‘statute’ of temporary workers. The ‘duplicity’ – factual, if not juridical because of the 
negotiated agreement – of employers with whom the worker has to interact does not al-
low for an effective assimilation of the temporary work supplier’s rights with those of 
the workers already employed, whether under standard or atypical contracts. Instead, 
precise specifications (if possible through the stipulation of a collective agreement for 
temporary work agencies’ employees, cf. art. 11, 5) regarding the active and passive le-
gal position of the worker, both in the supplier agency and the user enterprise, is re-
quired. 
A fundamental frame of reference in adjusting the general regulations to the particulari-
ties of this situation should be based on the principle of equal treatment, or of not dis-
tinguishing between permanent workers of the user enterprise and temporary work 
suppliers. In the relationship between the temporary work agency and the user enter-
prise, the principle of equal treatment should modify the character of manpower supply 
as mere speculation on other people’s work (art. 3, Act no. 1365/1960), and with re-
gard to the individual worker’s legal position, guarantee a good social integration of the 
worker into the collective of the user enterprise. Weighted according to collective rela-
tionships, the principle of equal treatment allows for the expression of the intermittent 
work force’s concerns that coincide with those, usually prevalent in union dynamics, of 
the permanent personnel either of the temporary work agency or of the user enterprise, 
avoiding both the dangerous phenomenon of social dumping and a polarisation of in-
terests between different groups of workers present in a given production context. 
For these reasons, in spite of the rubric of article 4 that refers to the economic condi-
tions of the temporary worker, it seems reasonable to assume by equal treatment not 
only that which is economic but also normative. In this sense the social parties have 
expressed themselves in the 1993 and 1996 Agreements which provide temporary 
 
workers, as evidenced by the same accompanying report of Bill no. 1918/1996, with 
‘conditions of full parity with the employees of the user company’. 
Article 4, para. 2 states, however, that the worker temporarily assigned to a user enter-
prise must be ‘paid out a wage not inferior to the one the employees at the same level 
of the user enterprise are entitled to receive’, without any specific referral to remunera-
tion, while article 1, paragraph 5, lett. (c) and article 3 paragraph 3 lett. (f) require that 
both the supply contract and in the temporary work contract specify the place, the 
working hours, ‘and the economic and normative remuneration of the working ser-
vices’, Practically speaking, several problems emerge, especially with reference to in-
consistent arrangements between the supplier and the user. More problematic is estab-
lishing wage levels for tasks and qualifications that according to die law that legitimises 
the resort to temporary labour, presumably do not normally exist in the enterprise. 
In case of open-ended hiring, the temporary work contract has to provide for a monthly 
indemnity of availability ‘divisible into hourly shares, and it will have to be paid by the 
same supplier enterprise during the periods the worker is waiting for assignment (art. 4, 
3). The indemnity should conform with the amount agreed upon by the collective 
agreement and should not be interior to the minimum fixed by Decree of the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Security; in the case of part-time work the amount is proportion-
ally reduced. It is important to note that the indemnity of availability is characterised as 
a type of minimal remuneration due to the worker hired with an open-ended contract. 
lf, as is the case with short periods of assignment, the remuneration received for the 
work effectively carried out in the user enterprise does not reach the indemnity level, 
the supplier enterprise is obliged to increase the remuneration until it equals the in-
demnity of availability. 
Special consideration should be given to die provision in article 3, paragraph 4 accord-
ing to which the worker ‘has the right to supply his work for the whole period of as-
signment, except in the case of not passing the trial period or the advent of a just cause 
for withdrawal from the contract’. In fact, in one way, the right to supply the ‘work ‘for 
the entire period of the mission represents a guarantee with respect to possible dis-
criminative practices against the worker, although it is easy to imagine how in practice 
the effectiveness of this provision is greatly weakened because of the relationship of 
power and economic interest that exists between worker and agency, on the one hand, 
and between the agency and the user enterprise, on the other. 
For these reasons it is not correct to state that article 3, paragraph 4 regulates only the 
withdrawal for just cause from the contract for fixed-term temporary work and refers to 
the general legislation on dismissals in the case of an open-ended temporary work con-
tract. Just cause for withdrawal, dealt with in article 3, paragraph 4, involves malfunc-
tions which affect the contract for the supply of temporary work and therefore, primar-
ily, the relationship between the supplier and the user enterprise. Paradoxically, in the 
contrary case, the temporary worker employed under an open-ended contract would be 
entitled to complete his mission even in the presence of justified reason (subjective or 
objective) for dismissal, although a just cause for withdrawal from the employment con-
tract is not mandatory. Similarly, the temporary worker, even if hired with an open-
ended contract, should be allowed to withdraw freely from the employment relation-
ship by giving his/her resignation during the trial period, even though he/she has re-
ceived the indemnity of availability in die waiting period before assignment. 
The advent of a cause for the legitimate cancellation of a contract for the supply of 
temporary work will obviously also have effect on the temporary work contract, in the 
sense that the fortunes of the employment contract are subordinate to those of the con-
tract which join the temporary work agency and the user enterprise. 
Such a case will imply, as a consequence, the cancellation of the fixed-term temporary 
work contract that, by definition, is effective for the length of time of the work 
performed for the user enterprise. There are, however, greater problems concerning the 
future of the open-ended temporary work contract, even if in this case strong doubts as 
to the logic and systematic nature can be raised concerning the application of the gen-
eral legislation of Act no. 604/1966 on the temporary work contract and the subsequent 
effects. 
This subject deserves attentive analysis (also with reference to problems connected with 
disciplinary action) that cannot be developed during a first consideration of articles 1-
11 of Act no. 196/1997. In the following discussion, it should be remembered that the 
general legislation concerning dismissals is structurally unrelated to the open-ended 
temporary work contract, on the one hand 
because it deals with a form of negotiation not related to article 2094 of the Civil Code 
and, on the other hand, because the withdrawal from the contract with notice is hardly 
compatible with the assignment period of the worker to the user enterprise. 
The question deserves more attentive consideration because the position mentioned 
above in purely problematic terms is a minority position. With respect to the open-
ended temporary work contract, only two premises for cancellation are admissible, 
both requiring a just cause for withdrawal from the employment contract: the mission 
interruption for a just cause for withdrawal from the supply contract that reflects 
(though not automatically, as in the fixed-term employment contract) its effects on the 
temporary work contract, on one hand, and the groundless refusal of a worker in avail-
ability to accept the execution of a mission, on the other. 
lf these considerations prove to be of merit, one can exclude the existence of another 
possibility for the withdrawal from the temporary work contract. It is not clear, how-
ever, what interest a temporary work agency could have in paying a fixed-term worker 
‘in availability’ who, as in this last case, once having accepted the mission, can then 
freely determine the cessation of the contractual obligation through simple notice. 
In this matter, the collective agreement for employees of the temporary work agency 
(cf. article 11, para. 5) will both regulate the procedures for withdrawal with notice dur-
ing the periods of availability of the worker hired with an open-ended contract prior to 
the assignment of a certain mission, and categorise the causes of withdrawal considered 
justified for the temporary worker’s periods of assignment, irrespective of the type of 
contract under which he was hired. This is the only way, at least in order not to com-
pletely ignore the interests of the temporary work agencies (already reasonably limited), 
to draw up open-ended temporary employment contracts. Thinking differently, the cir-
cumvention of the general legislation on dismissals will flow de facto from the eco-
nomic choices made by the supplier enterprises that will probably limit themselves to 
concluding fixed-term contracts with temporary workers, thus basically excluding the 
possibility that these workers benefit from a minimum income between one mission 
and another (this has so far come up in Germany where in contravention to the obliga-
tion to hire the temporary worker with an open-ended contract, practice shows a net 
predominance of precarious and temporary contractual relations). 
Aimed at limiting, if not completely excluding, the undeniable risks of ‘precariousness’ 
inherent in the situation of the temporary worker is article 5 of Act no. 196/1997 on 
professional training of temporary workers, in harmony with both the 1996 Agreement 
 
for work and the general efforts at reorganising professional training outlined by article 
17 of the same Act. Article 5 of the act sets up a Fund aimed at financing the temporary 
worker’s professional training and sustained by the supplier enterprises’ payment of a 
contribution equal to 5% of the remuneration paid to such workers. If states in the col-
lective agreements applicable to the supplier enterprises, the Fund can, moreover, as-
sign resources to support workers’ incomes ‘in periods of work shortage’ (art. 5, para. 
4), The implementation of this provision is subject to the issuing of a decree within sixty 
days from the date when the law goes into force. At this time it can only be assumed 
that training will occur in the periods which elapse between the several work assign-
ments (see Vittore and Landi, 1997). 
With specific reference to professional training as an ‘antidote’ to precariousness in 
employment relations, one can only puzzle over the exclusion of workers with limited 
professional qualifications from the field of application of the act. It is surely paradoxi-
cal that these workers in particular – already excluded from the ordinary labour market 
and, therefore, relegated to the hidden one – will not be able to benefit from those 
unique professional training initiatives mat could contribute to a real elevation out of 
their precarious status (Veneziani, 1993, Treu, 1995). Article 5 is perplexing from the 
user enterprises’ point of view as well. Within the general context of articles 1-11 of Act 
no. 196/1997, Art. 5 does not in fact guarantee the temporary work agencies any com-
petitive advantage based on the ‘quality’ of their human resources which time and time 
again are put at the disposal of the user enterprises. In fact, temporary workers’ training, 
as it is organised, presents itself as a purely coercive measure that does not fulfil a cor-
responding interest of the temporary work agency to raise the professional level and 
specialisation of its own employees. It must not be forgotten that all those clauses were 
intended to limit, even indirectly, the ability of the user enterprise to hire the worker at 
the end of contract for the supply of temporary work (art. 1, para, 6 and art. 3, para. 6). 
Even if this pro-vision is justified with respect to temporary employment contracts for a 
specified period, it is unreasonable if applied to temporary employment contracts for an 
indefinite period. Paradoxically, a provision conceived in the interest of temporary 
workers ends up being turned against them since it discourages the establishment of 
stable relations between user company and workers. A comparison can be made with 
Spain and Japan. Spanish and Japanese legislation consent indifferently to supplier en-
terprises establishing fixed-term or open-ended employment relationships with their 
own temporary workers. In practice, while the Spanish temporary work agencies have 
immediately tended towards fixed-term contracts. Japanese agencies, putting more 
stress on training and on investment in human resources, do not hesitate. on the con-
trary, to hire the huge majority of temporary workers (more than 80%) for an indefinite 
period (cf. Tiraboschi, 1995). It is easy to predict that, since provisions to sustain em-
ployment for an indefinite period are missing, Italian agencies will orient themselves, as 
the Spanish do, towards the activation of precarious contracts. 
If this is to be the orientation of the Italian supplier enterprises, it will be particularly dif-
ficult to assign to the temporary worker professional training with a connection be-
tween one assignment and another. The lack of juridical stability in employment rela-
tions with the temporary work agency will probably make the training process of the 
work force casual and irregular, both intricate and fragmentary. An analysis of the tem-
porary workers’ union rights reveals a noted distinction between me relations in a tem-
porary work agency and those between temporary worker and user enterprise. As far as 
the forms of representation of temporary workers within the temporary work agency are 
concerned, there are few regulations which establish ad hoc rules or provide for an ad-
aptation of the general rules to the peculiarities of this case. With the result – largely 
taken for granted – that this primary channel of representation for temporary workers is 
completely hypothetical and secondary. The formulation adopted by the Italian legisla-
tor on this point is quite limiting: ‘to the user enterprises’ employees have to apply the 
union rights stated by Act no. 300, 20 May 1970 and following modifications’ (art. 7, 
para. 1). Not only is any co-ordination missing between the forms of representation of 
the temporary work agency’s permanent workers and the temporary workers (for exam-
ple using a mechanism of polls division with respect to the creation of a RSA) and, 
within this last category, between workers hired with a fixed-term contract and workers 
hired with an open-ended contract, but there are also no minimal directions on how to 
quantify the work force that is, by definition, temporary and fluctuating. Italian regula-
tions typically do not give any consideration to how, concretely, to reconcile the en-
joyment of union rights (both active and passive) with a particular type of work and 
with the phenomenon, typical of the professional supply of manpower, of fragmenta-
tion and dispersion of the enterprise collective. The risk is that the important principle 
affirmed in article 7, para. 1 will remain a dead letter. 
The problem of counting the temporary work agency’s employees emerges, obviously, 
with regard to enforcement of the Workers’ Statute. Taking into consideration the for-
mulation of Act no. 196/1997, it is beyond dispute that the dimensional 
requisites of article 35 of the Statute can also be applied to temporary work agencies’ 
employees. With reference to union rights of temporary workers assigned to a user en-
terprise, article 7, para. 3 of Act no. 196/1997 does not hesitate to affirm that ‘the tem-
porary worker, for the whole length of his/her contract, has the right to exercise within 
the user enterprise the rights to freedom and to union activity, and even to participate in 
the assemblies of the user enterprises’ employees’. If, however, one tries to align the 
formal provision of the act with union practices, it clearly appears that. in this case as 
well, the acknowledgement of some rights to the temporary worker runs the risk of be-
ing purely theoretical. 
From a comparison of the provisions concerning temporary workers’ rights included in 
the national multi-industry Agreement of 20 December 1993 about the creation of uni-
tary union structures, it is possible to infer that a temporary worker can rarely satisfy the 
requisites stated in the agreement necessary to remain in the enterprise. With particular 
reference to the delicate question of the right to stand as a candidate, the collective 
bargaining at industry level which came after the national multi-industry Agreement of 
20 December 1993, even if slightly different in wording, has substantially confirmed 
this interpretation. In C.c.n.l., the eligibility of workers with a fixed-term contract or 
rather with a non-open-ended contract, including temporary workers, is provided for, at 
least theoretically. But this possibility is generally limited to the condition that, on the 
date of the elections, the employment contract is for a period which is not inferior to 6 
months. The right to stand as a candidate is therefore closed to those workers hired with 
a contract for a duration inferior to 6 months, and, in another situation, no device is 
provided to match the temporary/precarious employment period with the three-year of-
fice as RSU member. 
At the end of the non-open-ended employment contract, the appointed mandate ex-
pires automatically. However, even if one were to assert that these rules are not appli-
cable by analogy to the temporary labour force, it is, in any case, true that Italian union 
procedures have shown a total indifference towards the mechanisms of representation 
 
of the labour force present inside the company on a merely temporary basis (cf. 
Tiraboschi, 1996). On this point, a restrictive interpretation prevails that will lead to the 
exclusion, at the root, both of the right to vote and the right to stand as a candidate to 
the temporary worker on the presumption that this worker has no contractual obliga-
tions with the user enterprise (some have tried to refute this position through the valori-
sation of the existent bargaining connection, insisting on its application on a theoretical 
and practical level), And yet, despite some obvious difficulties, it does not appear that 
the status of the temporary worker is radically incompatible with the exercise of the 
right to vote. At the company level, the temporary worker must at least be recognised as 
having the right to participate in the elections of the representative for workers’ safety 
since article 18 of Legislative Decree no. 626/1994 holds that ‘the representative for 
safety is elected directly by the workers and chosen among them’, and does not require 
that the worker be in a position of legal subordination to the user. 
Union rights, according to article 7 of Act no. 196/1997, only attain a significant degree 
of efficiency if they apply to the collective interests of the stable labour force of the user 
enterprise. User enterprises are required by Article 7, para. 4 to communicate to the 
unitary union structure, or to plant-level union structures and, in their absence, to the 
territorial trade associations adherent to the comparatively representative national con-
federations, the frequency and the reasons for recourse to temporary work rather than 
the supply contract, as well as, every 12 months, the number and the reasons for the 
temporary work supply contracts, their length, the number and the qualification of the 
workers involved. 
As already affirmed elsewhere (Tiraboschi, 1996), in order to resolve the delicate prob-
lem of representation of the temporary work-force’s collective interests, while avoiding 
tensions and antagonisms between the precarious labour force and the steady one, it 
must be recognised as part of the general problem of ‘participation’. One cannot but 
agree with those who, faced with ‘the mutation that (...) the labour factor is undergoing, 
both in contents and execution (and in the contractual typologies used)’, presses for ‘a 
corresponding process of change and adaptation of union action, in the exercising of its 
protective function of workers’ interests (...) and the opening towards participation 
models’ (on this point see Carabelli, 1996). With reference to temporary work through 
an agency, the search for adequate channels of communication between the individual 
and the collectivity cannot be limited to traditional profiles concerning union rights or 
the access for temporary workers to the functions of representation inside the company, 
but must reach far beyond, through research and experimentation of new forms of rep-
resentation and the merging of these, so to speak, disparate interests. 
 
 
Deregulation and reform of collective labour relations 
 
In collective labour relations, we cannot speak of a process of deregulation because this 
area of labour law is still completely unregulated. New pieces of legislation are under 
discussion and soon we will have an act on collective bargaining and trade union rep-
resentation. If we look at present practice, it is not possible to speak even of a process 
of decentralisation of collective bargaining. Rather the key issue is the co-ordination be-
tween the three levels of bargaining, inter-confederation, national industry-wide enter-
prise and plant level. 
In the absence of state regulations, a major contribution to the co-ordination of the bar-
gaining system came from the tripartite agreement of July 1993. As agreed in this social 
pact, the clauses in the national contract governing hiring and firing practices, job clas-
sification, working hours, career paths are to be negotiated every 4 years, while wage 
clauses will be renewed every 2 years. Bargaining will take place at both national and 
plant level. However, plant level bargaining takes place only every 4 years and only on 
issues not already regulated by the national contract. 
This co-ordination supports a trend towards consensual governing of industrial relations 
and provides at least de facto a major control of conflicts. 
Collective bargaining, supported by new legislation, will probably continue to be the 
main instrument in governing industrial relations in the future. It may be a complement 
but not a substitute for more or less institutionalised forms of joint consultation and 
workers participation. There is still a wide distrust in Italy regarding participation. 
Workers, without wishing to create tension and antagonisms between the stable and the 
precarious workforce, no longer side step the problem of participation. 
The changes in the workforce press for a corresponding process of change and adapta-
tion within the union in exercising its function of protecting workers interest and open-
ing towards participation models. In this respect the hot issue is the request by the em-
ployer associations for lower pay rates in the depressed area of the south of Italy. While 
CISL and UIL trade union confederations have indicated that they are willing to open 
negotiations on allowing companies in the south to pay wages below the national 
minimum rates for a fixed period, CGIL is strongly opposed. 
More recently we have experimented with new kinds of negotiation through the intro-
duction of area contracts and territorial pact. These contracts and pacts are broad 
agreements at local level between companies, trade unions, banks and local authorities 
to promote economic development and reduce unemployment through a high level of 
flexibility in regulating employment relationships. The continued control at national 
level of wages is meant to regulate competition among employers, in the Italian case it 
has also been an instrument of controlling inflation in order to respect the criteria laid 
down in Maastricht by the E.U. 
 
 
Evaluation of current deregulation (driving forces of deregulation) 
 
As far as Italy is concerned, all the points indicated in our program apply: counter-
measures against unemployment, pressure from global competition, international pres-
sure to harmonise regulation. In employer and in some academic circles there is a 
strong emphasis on deregulation as an instrument to revitalise the economy and fight 
the high level of unemployment. Employment legislation is seen more and more as an 
obstacle to the development of the economy and one of the most important factors that 
lead to high unemployment. In my opinion, from a position balancing the advantages 
of the free market and the constraints of law, the issue of the deregulation of employ-
ment relations is not only badly posed and misleading but also historically incorrect. 
As a reaction to a new organisation of production methods and circulation of wealth, 
employment regulation was not, in fact, a unilateral method of protection and emanci-
pation of the weaker party of the contract. Not always supported by values and unified 
political, economic and social objectives, right from the very beginning the state’s regu-
latory intervention in the labour market never assumed a unidirectional aspect. Beyond 
 
the contingent motivation of each single norm, the regulation of employment assumes 
importance right from the beginning not only as part of the traditional framework of 
worker protection, but also of those concurrent and certainly no less important factors 
like conservation of social peace, rationalisation of the productive system, regulation of 
the forms of competition among entrepreneurs, The product of the legislation of em-
ployment relations is therefore, undoubtedly, not only a distributive right of protection 
of resources, but also, at the same time, a right of production, i.e. a discipline of roles 
and of the means of production in an industrial society. 
For these reason I don’t think it is correct to speak of a crisis in labour law connected to 
the recent process of deregulation, In my opinion, labour law is simply an instrument of 
regulation of society and of the economy and it can work or not work. Probably it is 
more correct to speak of a crisis of a certain image of labour law, but this is quite differ-
ent. The emphasis is now not only on the protection of the weaker party but moreover 
on the rationalisation of the productive system. Labour law as an instrument of regulat-
ing the way of working in a capitalistic society is still valid. So we have to find ways to 
help labour law work better. In this way the stress is more on ‘derigiditication’, simplifi-
cation, and nationalisation than on a mere deregulation and a return to market rules. In 
any case the advantage of the free market as regard the substance of the economy and 
the fight against unemployment is not at all clear. No particular proof exists showing 
that a deregulation of employment relation can, per se, bring about a reduction in un-
employment on an increase in competitiveness in enterprises. On the contrary, it seems 
well-illustrated that the excessive precariousness of employment relations, other than 
destroying stable work posts, ends up, in the long run, proving itself to be counterpro-
ductive for the entire productive system by taking away from the enterprises a qualified 
and particularly reliable work-force. 
From this perspective, what seems to have more importance is not brutal deregulation 
but structural policies of employment, access to the system of credit and to market capi-
tal, locally based policies of support of the local productive and social system, and 
moreover the rules that discipline international commerce and relations among differ-
ent national states. I believe that the recent deregulation of labour law and the crisis of 
legality that characterises Italy, a crisis characterised by the extremely high level of 
black market work and an informal economy, cannot be, in any case, explained merely 
on the basis of a diffuse wish to escape from regulation considered invasive and too 
heavy for the employer. In my opinion it is the recent loss of state sovereignty over the 
rules that control the mechanism of production and transfer of wealth that affect indi-
rectly but in a decisive way the ineffective discipline of work, So globalisation and in-
ternationalisation of the economy are really the most powerful driving force of the 
process of deregulation. 
In this respect I think that not only national government but also international institu-
tions like the European Community are not at present capable of controlling the eco-
nomic-productive structure, and at the most, limit themselves to finding palliatives to 
resist change and contain the effects at the social level or are reduced to merely taking 
note of the change in progress. Not even in large homogeneous areas like the E.C. is 
there any movement towards the elaboration of a regulative method of alternative ju-
ridical models of the subordinate employment contract for an indefinite period, Two 
years ago I was in a large research group on the transposition in five different countries 
of the directives on health and safety at work, and the result of this research clearly in-
dicated that the process of transposition led to a process of diversification rather than 
harmonisation of rules. In reality, even though changes have occurred in the economic 
production system, on the regulative level there is still today strong national resistance 
to a supra-national project of re-regulation of the criteria of legitimisation of the acquisi-
tion of the value-added through the work of others. Without any form of supra-national 
control I see, at least in Italy, the start of a process-informalisation from contract toward 
status. I wonder if the recent changes in the economy will lead us to abandon the tradi-
tional distinction between subordinate workers and the self-employed in order to arrive 
at an essential core of imperative regulations and principles common to all bargaining 
relationships concerning labour. 
 
 
The role of labour law in the 21st century: do we need a new concept of labour law? 
 
The technique adopted by Act no. 196/1997 for the regulation of temporary work 
through an agency represents undoubtedly a substantial starting point to begin a more 
exhaustive reform of Italian employment law and to provide a clear regulation of atypi-
cal work forms in general. Given the specific legal and cultural context of Italy, simple 
deregulation is not possible. On the contrary, it will be necessary to experiment, as we 
have said, with doses of ‘regulated-by-law flexibility’ which contribute to the creation 
of a climate favouring employment and to the recovery of the broad areas of black 
market work. The Government’s commitment, formally affirmed in agreements with the 
social parties, consists in fact in loosening some of Italian labour law’s real rigidities, 
but without destructuring the market of steady and full-time labour. Within this broad 
context, characterised by specific bonds of economic and social compatibility, the in-
evitable problem of redefining the boundary between independent and dependent work 
cannot be simplistically – and unrealistically – achieved by intervention directed at pe-
nalising atypical work, the co-ordinated arrangements and new forms of work organisa-
tion. Legislative intervention to establish a typology for a new bargaining scheme (co-
ordinated work) does not seem relevant either. The market requires flexibility, simple 
rules, certainty of the law: a new definition introducing a contractual tertium genus 
would do nothing but foster litigation, uncertainties in definition and an escape into the 
black economy. 
More convincing and realistic is the idea of a Statute of new work which, pragmati-
cally, would address the problem of new employment forms from the point of view of 
protection (and of their remodelling as regards all employment relations), rather than 
with a view to the creation of formal definitions and concepts. The idea should be 
abandoned of defining and classifying a contractual reality which rapidly and con-
stantly changes, in order to arrange, on the contrary, un essential and limited core of 
imperative rules and principles (above all with reference to the Constitution) common 
to all bargaining relationships concerning labour. 
In brief, the Statute should be operative at two separate levels but with the aim of sus-
taining each other. On the one hand, we could conceive a voluntary measure to stimu-
late certification, in the administrative setting, of the qualification assigned by the par-
ties to a specific labour relationship; on the other hand, in order to make such a meas-
ure effective, it will be necessary to move towards a removal of some of the clauses 
which contribute to promoting litigation over employment relations and the physical 
escape into the black market and the area of atypical employment (as distinguished 
from the pathological escape that, in addition to an erosion of labour guarantees, is also 
 
an element of distortion of the competition between enterprises and must therefore be 
terminated), outlining a new way of fundamentally reducing the distinctions under the 
present norm and most of all the characteristics which, at the moment, define inde-
pendent and dependent employment relations. The mechanism of employment rela-
tions certification can reasonably work only if, in the interim, the game of convenience 
(for both parties) is made more balanced. The convenience game is the return of em-
ployment relations into a particular bargaining scheme rather than into a new one, only 
because it is convenient for the parties. From this perspective, a Statute of new work 
could offer the possibility of modulating and graduating (typologically) the protection 
enforceable in every kind of agreement in conformity with the categories represented 
by concentric circles which – along with a continuum of modalities in work execution 
– extend from the minimum and imperative protection enforceable for all employment 
relations, to the guarantees belonging only to dependent work (protection against dis-
missals). 
The issue of employment relations certification as an answer to the swell of legal cases 
on the subject of contract qualification, does not seem to pose any particular problems, 
on the condition, obviously, that the bargaining program ex ante agreed upon by the 
parties will be respected during the exercise of the employment relations. In order to 
foster certification and support the parties’ will, it would be useful, moreover, to distin-
guish between an area of absolute incontrovertibility or of public order (in other words, 
related to the worker’s fundamental rights), and not at the parties’ disposal under pen-
alty of relations re-qualification in judicial session, and an area of relative incontro-
vertibility, administrated by the collective partners during collective bargaining and/or 
by the same individual partners as established by the employment relation but, in this 
last case, only before the administrative body qualified for the certification (wages over 
minimum, management of career paths, terms of notice, relationship stability, allow-
ance in case of relationship suspension, working time modulation, etc.). 
More critical, undoubtedly, is the part concerned with the remodelling of employment 
protections for which adequate political and social consent can hardly be realised, but, 
surprisingly, taboos and ideological difference emerge anew. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the regulation of atypical work imposes a rewriting (at least 
in pan) of the traditional dependent work protections, for the corresponding normative 
realignment of social security benefits, an outlining of a social security regime common 
to all independent and dependent workers Which, granting a basic social-insurance tax 
revenue for all employment relations, contributes to making less dramatic the qualifying 
problem of individual work forms for the social insurance providers as well. An inter-
vention of mere regulatory nature into atypical work forms, without a corresponding 
redefinition of the dependent work statute, will only contribute to making labour man-
agement rules more pervasive, and thus stimulating a further escape into the hidden 
economy and a reaction in the form of labour outsourcing and enterprise relocation.  
A serious reform bill cannot, in consequence, ignore this issue. In this connection, 
frankly puzzling is the ideological preliminary question concerning dismissals posed by 
some political and trade union forces, referring to a normative and social framework 
which already provides for broad forms of evasion of the employment stability rule. 
Apart from black, grey, etc. work, nobody can deny, watching developments in the de-
pendent labour market, for the most part through the legitimate resort to temporary 
work typologies, fictitious training contracts (apprenticeship, work-training contract) 
and to independent and co-ordinated work contracts where the rules concerning dis-
missals are not enforced. Why should we accept this hypocrisy, if only to not touch on 
the dismissal issue, instead of following a policy aimed at effectively re-launching the 
open-ended labour contract and youth employment? There is no shortage of ideas 
about these matters. Apart from the prohibition of discriminatory dismissals or for ill-
ness or maternity, one could cease enforcing individual dismissals, without impairing 
the protections of the adult labour force firmly inserted in a business context (a) for 
those workers in their first working experience with an open-ended dependent em-
ployment contract and not over the age of 32; (b) for all new hiring, during the first two 
years of work, in provinces where the average yearly rate of unemployment, according 
to the broadened ISTAT definition, recorded for the year before the hiring, reaches the 
level of at least 3% with reference to the national average as it results from the same re-
cord; (c) for those workers who have less than two years’ seniority of service with the 
same employer. 
There is no shortage of ideas. What is missing is the capability (the courage?) of aban-
doning old schemes and consolidated paradigms which do not correspond anymore to 
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